Wittgenstein's lectures on the foundations of mathematics (Cambridge, 1939). From the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Edited by Cora Diamond. Ithaca, N.Y. (Cornell University Press). 1976. 300 pp by unknown
HM8 Reviews 205 
innerhalb des Briefwechsels aufweisen u. ;i. m. Die redaktionelle 
Bearbeitung der Anmerkungen nebst der notwendigen cbersetzung 
aus dem Russischen besorgte P. Hoffmann. Ein ausfiihrliches 
Personenregister (Lebensdaten, wissenschaftliche Stellung; Seiten 
381-408) beschlieBt den Textteil, dem noch vier Kunstdrucktafeln 
(Karten und eine numerische Rechnung von Eulers Hand) folgen. 
Das gebotene Material ist mit gro8er Sorgfalt hervorragend 
aufgearbeitet worden. Die Bestatigung des ersten Satzes der 
Einleitung "Briefe von und an Euler sind inuner ein Ereignis" 
wird jedem Leser dieser Ausgabe nicht schwer fallen. 
WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 
(Cambridge, 1939). From the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, 
Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Edited 
by Cora Diamond. Ithaca, N.Y. (Cornell University Press). 
1976. 300 pp. 
Reviewed by Ignacio Anyelelli 
University of Texas, 
Austin, TX 78712 
From notes taken by Bosanquet, Rhees, Malcolm, and Smythies, 
the editor of this volume, Cora Diamond, has attempted to re- 
construct the lectures on the foundations of mathematics given 
in 1939 by Wittgenstein in Cambridge. The text contains not 
only Wittgenstein's statements but also many questions and re- 
plies from those who were present, including such names as 
Turing and Von Wright. 
Only some of the topics discussed in these lectures belong 
strictly in the foundations of mathematics (example: the notion 
of infinity); much of the material falls within the areas of 
ontology, lqgic and epistemology (examples: necessity, predi- 
cation, contradiction). 
In connection with infinity Wittgenstein's main point is to 
free his students from the picture that arithmetical infinity 
is something "huge," "big" (p. 255), "enormous, colossal" (p. 
2531, that numbers are given as "trailing off into the distance 
too far for one to see" (p. 170). The three dots in "1, 2, 3..." 
are not abbreviations as in the case of "the alphabet is A, B, 
c I' . . . . Wittgenstein blames the mathematician Hardy for speaking 
"as though [the phrase 'and so on'] were always an abbreviation. 
As if a superman would write a huge series on a huge board . .." 
(p. 171). The incorrect association of "infinite" with "big" 
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is a consequence of bad teaching: "when one is a child, 'in- 
finite' is explained as something huge." 
What is arithmetical infinity for Wittgenstein and how would 
he teach the proper use of the term 'infinite'? Obviously he 
has in mind the old, familiar notion of potential infinity. If 
asked to teach the proper use of the word, Wittgenstein would 
probably point to someone who has mastered an arithmetical 
technique such as multiplication and who is able to repeat in- 
definitely the same schema. This possibility is infinity; there 
is nothing "huge" about it (p. 256). 
This conception of infinity appears to be just an instance 
of Wittgenstein's constructive, operational, rule-oriented 
(p. 246, 251, etc.) philosophy of mathematics, which has been 
criticized by several authors, but usually for the wrong reason 
(a discussion of the criticisms is found in Wittgenstein's Phil- 
osophy of Mathematics, a Doctoral Dissertation written by 
Virginia Klenk at the University of Pittsburgh, 1972). Accord- 
ing to this reviewer, Wittgenstein is basically using the right 
approach: it is the rather unfinished, occasionally too elemen- 
tary and superficial presentation that may be criticized 
(Wittgenstein's loose remarks should be compared with a full, 
systematic formulation such as, for example, that in P. Lorenzen's 
Einfiihrung in die Operative Logik und Mathematik, Berlin, 1955). 
On the notion of necessity Wittgenstein appears to be in- 
clined toward an epistemic view: "What is necessary is deter- 
mined by the rules" (p. 241). Necessity is relative to a 
calculus: "We might speak of getting something but not neces- 
sarily, in the case of a calculus in which you could get more 
than one answer," by contrast with the calculus in which, for 
example, 21 x 14 has exactly one answer (p. 242). There are 
analogous remarks for "possible" (pp. 146-147). There is hardly 
any novelty in this epistemic view of the modalities, but one 
of Wittgenstein's statements is interesting. After saying that 
"what is necessary is determined by the rules," he immediately 
notes: "Was it necessary or arbitrary to give these rules? 
And here we might say that a rule was arbitrary if we made it 
just for fun and necessary if having this particular rule were 
a matter of life and death. We must distinguish between a 
necessity in the system and a necessity of the whole system" 
(p 241). 
In the tclnic of predication Wittgenstein feels very uncom- 
fortable with the modern logical analysis of quantification, 
which, according to Wittgenstein, introduces an x of which a 
predicate ("man," "chair") is asserted (p. 167). His trouble 
seems to be that in his view nobody knows what that x is: 
"There is an x which is a man. What should you say it is that 
is a man?" (p. 167). "Suppose I say, 'This sofa is green,' 
then the predicate is 'is green.' If I then ask what it is 
that has the property 'green,' you would imagine something like 
HM8 Reviews 207 
a colourless sofa" (p. 263). "Russell says 'I met a man' means 
'There is an x, such that x is a man and I met x.' Now what 
is the x here which is a man?" (p. 264). Shortly thereafter 
Wittgenstein repeats his question more forcefully: "Now what 
in the hell is this x?" (p. 264). 
Wittgenstein is horrified by the idea that the x in question 
is a totally undetermined entity. He claims that we "never talk 
about bare individuals" (p. 268). The analysis of "Socrates is 
a man" into a predicate "is a man" and "something else" (repre- 
sented by the x) involves for him the introduction of a non- 
sensical "bare individual" (p. 268) of which the predicate is 
said. 
This, however, only shows a misunderstanding on Wittgenstein's 
part of the whole business of writing an x as intended by Frege 
in his 1879 Bergriffsschrift. The x is not introduced to name 
any "bare particular" but merely to indicate a blank in which 
singular terms can be written or relative to which a certain 
"quantification" may be asserted. 
Wittgenstein's remarks on the significance of contradictions 
(with particular reference to the contradiction discovered by 
Russell in Frege's system) are perplexing: "If a contradiction 
may lead you into trouble, so may anything. It is no more likely 
to do so than anything else" (p. 219). Also: "You might get 
p & -p by means of Frege's system. If you can draw any conclu- 
sion you like from it, then that, as far as I can see, is all 
the trouble you can get into. And I would say, 'Well, then, 
just don't draw any conclusions from a contradiction"' (p. 220). 
In the final analysis, however, Wittgenstein dislikes contra- 
dictions: it is reassuring to hear from him that contradictions 
"jam" (pp. 178, 179, 187). 
The following passage reveals one general feature of 
Wittgenstein's method: "I can as a philosopher talk about 
mathematics because I will only deal with puzzles which arise 
from the words of our ordinary everday language, such as 'proof,' 
'number,' 'series,' 'order' etc." (P. 14). It is not clear 
to this reviewer why these puzzles should have any special sig- 
nificance; they may well be the dull results of an ill-digested 
history of logic or of mathematics. Such linguistic puzzles 
are products of culture, not of nature, and accordingly they 
do not deserve the awesome respect with which a physicist or 
a biologist observes "natural" puzzles. The distinction be- 
tween culture and nature was commonly stressed by certain phil- 
osophers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries--not, 
however, by Frege or Russell, who constitute Wittgenstein's 
basic background. 
